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Introduction
Two major events of 1997 and 1998—the forest fires and smoke covering Southeast 
Asia and the worst financial crisis since the beginning of President Suharto's New 
Order—have made it safe to say that Indonesia has lost its invisibility.1 2 On the surface, 
the fires and the crisis seem like unrelated events which each emerged from a series of 
causes beyond the regime's control. One could be forgiven for thinking that the fires 
were simply a natural crisis. Obviously, the regime could do nothing to control the 
periodic warming of ocean currents known as the El Nino Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO), which brought extended drought to the country. Similarly, the long-praised 
"sound fundamentals" of Indonesia's economy seemed unshakable until (and even 
after) Thailand's currency crisis led to a parallel currency crisis and investor lack of
1 Appreciation is due to the WWF-Indonesia Program for forwarding information, the Indonesia-L and 
Indonesia-P lists for providing a steady stream of information, and the host of websites available on the 
fires, especially that of the EFFM (Integrated Forest Fire Management) project of GTZ (Gesellschaft fur 
Technische Zusammanarbeit) (http://sm d.m ega.net.id/iffm /). Also, thanks to Deborah Homsher for 
inviting me to write this piece (and patiently waiting for the result) and to Eveline Ferretti for reading an 
earlier draft. The viewpoints expressed and the errors are my own responsibility.
2 Scholars of Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular have reflected on their lesser status among the 
cocktail party circuit who still wonder whether Indonesia is somewhere "near Bali." The catchphrase 
identifying Indonesia as an "invisible" nation is from Donald K. Emmerson, "Invisible Indonesia," Foreign 
Affairs 66 (Winter 1987/88): 368-387.
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confidence in Indonesia's economy—and its political present and future.3 That these 
two events occurred roughly in the same period seemed to be the worst of historical 
accidents.
However, I argue in this paper that the fire and financial crises are closely related. 
Both seemingly "natural" crises are generated by the particular political economy of 
natural resource-based development in Indonesia over the last three decades. The fires 
are the outcome of three decades of opening Indonesia's forests to exploitation and the 
export of timber products. This pattern of forest exploitation has culminated most 
recently in the over-rapid conversion of much of Sumatra and Kalimantan into 
plantations. The financial crisis is the outcome of the unfettered deregulation of the 
banking sector in the last ten years and deregulation of private investment generally to 
finance natural resource development and dubious pet projects of the regime. Both 
have emerged in response to the structural demands of mobile capital.4 Both have also 
ironically been couched in the nationalistic claims of Indonesia's political and 
economic leaders who argue that these actions are necessary for "development." The 
nationalism of the New Order is initially convincing; it seems realistic for a developing 
country facing a hostile international environment that requires market insertion and 
economic growth at all costs to facilitate development. At least, the New Order has 
argued, the natural resources are being (should be) exploited for the benefit of 
Indonesians. However, the contemporary "nationalism" is surreal and unconvincing if 
compared to the more broadly based nationalism of the earlier Sukarno era or the era 
marked by Indonesia's struggle for national independence from the Dutch. The 
number of actual beneficiaries who profit from today's New Order "nationalism" is 
small, and almost all these beneficiaries have direct links to Suharto himself.
The fires, then, provide an opportunity to analyze the pattern of development and 
to point out some of its ecological and social contradictions. The opportunity may be 
brief. While the existence of Indonesia may have penetrated the global consciousness 
for good, interest in the forest fires, unfortunately, may evaporate as soon as the smoke 
clears. Ironically, the proposed solutions to the financial crisis, represented both by the 
IMF bailout and the policies advocated by those who currently wield political and 
economic power in Indonesia, do not auger well for a nation that seeks to avoid any 
recurrence and escalation of the fires, nor do they seem likely to enhance the welfare of 
and opportunities available to forest dwellers.
I divide my argument into four parts. In the first, I review the history of interaction 
between natural and anthropogenic causes of the earlier great fires in East Kalimantan 
(Indonesian Borneo). In the second, I briefly summarize the available data on the 1997- 
98 fires. Then, in the third section, I look at the history of timber and forestry 
development from logging to industrial tree and agricultural tree crop plantations. In 
the final section, I examine the politics of blame and accountability that continue to 
thwart the development of alternatives.
3 In addition to the World Bank and the IMF, the Australian economist Hal Hill has been perhaps one of 
the most enthusiastic in lavishing praise on Indonesia. See, for example, Hal Hill, "Indonesia's Industrial 
Policy and Performance: 'Orthodoxy' Vindicated," Economic Development and Cultural Change 15,1 (1996): 
147-174.
4 See Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996).
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I. Lessons Not Learned
"[I]f human activity continues to intensify, the next major fire event will 
be much worse." 5
In 1982-83 a series of well-known fires burned 3.2 million hectares of forest in East 
Kalimantan. These fires were more extensive and also more thoroughly researched 
than any previous fires in the region. German foresters and their Indonesian 
colleagues, especially, produced comprehensive studies of the event.6 Out of these and 
other studies came a new appreciation of the naturalness of fire in the tropics, 
particularly Kalimantan, and more importantly, of the growing impact of humans on 
the spatial extent and intensity of burning. They also point to the fact that the lessons 
that could have been gleaned from these previous fires were not learned; the reason for 
this failure, I would argue, is the political economy of resource extraction in Indonesia.
The Naturalness of Fire and Anthropogenic Factors
Forest ecologists have begun to recognize the natural importance of fire and the 
dangers of complete fire suppression. In the US, for example, fire is now understood as 
critical to healthy regeneration of certain ecosystems, such as prairies in the midwest. 
Total fire prevention, the sort of policy advocated in the old Smoky the Bear 
campaigns, carries with it the danger of ultimately producing more intense fires due to 
excessive build-up of flammable material; the disastrous fires that have visited 
Yellowstone National Park and southern California residential areas make this lesson 
clear. In the everwet (or perhumid) tropics, the situation is different since the rapid 
cycling of organic material means that little organic waste accumulates on the forest 
floor. Yet in the tropics, too, there is a "natural" fire regime, though it hardly resembles 
that of temperate zones.7
In East Kalimantan, Goldammer and Seibert have found charcoal residue evidence 
of ancient wildfires that were Carbon-14 dated between circa 17,510 BP and 350 BP. 
These dates reveal that "wildfires occurred not only during the dry Pleistocene, but 
also after the present wet, rain forest climate stabilized, at about 10,000 to 7,000 BP."8 
Goldammer and Seibert argue further that during the last glaciation the lowland 
Sunda shelf (off present-day Borneo's east coast) and today's remnant lowlands were 
drier and experienced "frequent droughts and fires," thereby preventing a few
8 Harold Brookfield and Yvonne Byron, South-East Asia's Environmental Future: The search for sustainability 
(New York: United Nations University Press, 1993), p. 267.
6 See W. Schindele, W. Thoma, and K. Panzer, Investigation of the Steps Needed to Rehabilitate the Areas of East 
Kalimantan Seriously Affected by Fire: The Forest Fire 1982/83 in East Kalimantan, Part I: The Fire, the Effects, the 
Damage and Technical Solutions, FR- Report No. 5 (Feldkirchen: Deutsche Forstservice GmbH, 1989).
7 The everwet tropics are distinguished analytically by biologists from the seasonal or monsoon forests, 
but both are included in the term "tropical moist forest." In the everwet tropics, every month has rainfall 
over 100 mm or there are only short dry spells of a few days or weeks. T. C. Whitmore, An Introduction to 
Tropical Rain Forests (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
8 J. G. Goldammer and B. Seibert, "The Impact of Droughts and Forest Fires on Tropical Lowland Rain 
Forest of East Kalimantan," in Fire in the Tropical Biota: Ecosystem Processes and Global Challenges, ed. J. G. 
Goldammer (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990), pp. 12-13.
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dominant species from creating species-poor communities.9 In sum, it becomes clear 
that although some fires occur naturally in these regions, they tend to be extremely 
rare, and the conditions that lead to fires return at geologic time intervals that are 
centuries long.
The huge fire event of 1982-83 was clearly sparked by conditions that existed as a 
result of both natural weather patterns and human intervention. Beginning in June 
1982, East Kalimantan (and Sabah) did experience its worst drought since 1878, and the 
natural stress was severe in the lowlands nearer to the east coast.10 In some areas, up to 
70 percent of the commercial-size trees (over 60 cm dbh: diameter at breast height, 
measured in centimeters) died from drought.11 Subsequent studies of the fires, though, 
indicated that humans had contributed to the disaster in more ways than simply by 
lighting the match in a year of severe ENSO drought. Though government officials and 
loggers tended to lay the blame on shifting cultivators—small farmers—for setting the 
fires in this period, in fact the industry itself was the main culprit, for it had disturbed 
large areas of forest by logging and consequently made those areas more vulnerable to 
fire.
The role of logging was confirmed by the data (see Table 1). In the region affected 
by the fires, 69 percent of the area was forested, and most of this forest had been 
disturbed to some degree. The area of disturbed forest that burned was six times as 
large as the area of shifting cultivation land that burned.12 More significantly, the 
percent of forested area affected by fire was highest in the moderately and heavily 
disturbed areas. The logging industry was thus clearly implicated in exacerbating the 
fires. The peripheral damage created by selective logging contributed to the problem 
by leaving large amounts of combustible material on the forest floor, creating canopy 
openings that led to growth of additional understory vegetation, and by creating 
"highways" where logs had been extracted through which the fires could penetrate the 
forest.13
9 J. G. Goldammer and B. Seibert, "Natural Rain Forest Fires in Eastern Borneo During the Pleistocene and 
Holocene," Die Naturwissenschaften 76 (1989): 519. This view is controversial because it implies that 
biodiversity is the result of disturbance, not diversification under stable conditions. But, in a period of 
increasing recognition by geographers, ecologists and others of the lack of truly pristine, untouched 
environments, the view is less surprising. In fact, the high level of diversity in shifting cultivators' 
managed gardens has been highlighted recently. See, for example, C. Padoch and N. L. Peluso, eds. Borneo 
in Transition: People, Forests, Conservation, and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
10 The upland regions in the middle of the island of Kalimantan/Bomeo generally experience higher 
rainfall, upwards of 4,000 mm per year in typical years, and have been less affected by drought and fire 
both in the 1980s and 1990s.
11 Cynthia Mackie, "The Lessons Behind East Kalimantan's Forest Fires," Borneo Research Bulletin, 16,2 
(1984), 63-74.
12 Without going back to the original German study, one cannot be sure how the areas of shifting 
cultivation were defined, for instance whether calculation included cultivated areas only or also included 
fallow areas.
13 C. Mackie, "The Lessons," p. 65. It is important to note that these are effects of logging under the rules 
of the Indonesian Selective Logging system, although they are surely exacerbated in cases where 
companies illegally returned to logging blocks sooner than permitted, that is before thirty-five years had 
elapsed.
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Table 1
Burned and Unbumed Areas of Vegetation and Land-Use Types in East 
Kalimantan 1982-83 Forest Fires
Area
Vegetation/Land-use Types Total Binned Unbumed
('000
ha)
(%)a ('000 ha) (%)b ('000
ha)
(%)b
I. Mixed lowland forests 3244 69 2175 67 1069 33
A. Undisturbed forest 410 9 46 11 364 89
B. Disturbed forest 2807 60 2103 75 704 25
1. tightly 1096 23 636 58 460 42
2. moderately 984 21 827 84 157 16
3. heavily 727 15 640 88 87 12
II. Converted to Plantations 27 1 26 96 1 4
HI. Limestone/ rock forest 43 1 24 56 19 44
IV. Rerangas/ heath forest 40 1 18 45 22 55
V. Peat/freshwater swamp 
forest
566 12 405 72 161 28
A. Undisturbed 181 4 30 17 151 83
B. Disturbed 385 8 375 97 10 3
VI. Other swamp vegetation 110 2 90 82 20 18
VII. Brackish swamp 
vegetations
22 0 5 23 17 77
Vin. Tidal forests 41 1 0 0 41 100
TOTAL FOREST AREAS 4066 86 2717 67 1349 33
IX. Shifting cultivation 387 8 329 85 58 15
X. Permanent 
cultivation/settlement
213 5 147 69 66 31
XI. Water bodies 67 1 0 0 67 100
TOTAL STUDY AREA 4733 100 3193 67 1540 33
Source: Nengah Wirawan, "The Hazard of Fire," in South-east Asia's Environmental Future, ed. Harold 
Brookfield and Yvonne Byron (New York: UN University Press, 1993), Table 11.1, based on Schindele, 
Thoma, and Panzer, The Kalimantan Forest fire 1982-3 in East Kalimantan Part I (1989).
Notes: a =  percentage of the total study area of 4,733,000 hectares.
b =  percentage (burned or unbumed) of the particular vegetation type
In addition to noting which sorts of areas proved more vulnerable to fire, one can 
also distinguish by type and intensity of fire. The undisturbed forests generally 
suffered surface fires that damaged the undergrowth, which can recover more quickly 
than the canopy. However, Wirawan and the German study found that fires in logged- 
over areas were canopy fires of varying intensity. In "lightly disturbed" forest, fires 
burned the lower and middle layers of the canopy; in "moderately disturbed" forest, 
the fire reached some of the upper canopy as well; and in "heavily disturbed" forest,
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"the whole forest structure was destroyed by the fire and the surviving trees occurred 
primarily as scattered individuals or groups of individuals."14
Finally, in a period when the spatial extent of plantations was still small in 
Kalimantan, research about the fires did not draw much attention, but there were 
ominous results in the German study. Only 27,000 hectares of forest in the fire region 
had been converted, but fire destroyed this area almost completely (96 percent). 
Comparably complete burning occurred (97 percent) in the somewhat larger area of 
disturbed peat and freshwater swamp forest. At the other end of the spectrum, only 11 
percent of the undisturbed lowland forest and 17 percent of the undisturbed swamp 
forest burned. By the late 1990s, with large-scale plantation development and the more 
recent million hectare ricefields mega-project underway in Central Kalimantan's 
swamp forest, these uses had become much more significant. The vulnerability of such 
developed areas to fire was the most important lesson not learned from the early 1980s.
II. The 1997-98 Drought and Fires
The data is not all in yet, but it is already clear that the 1997 and 1998 fires are the 
most extensive since the 1982-83 fires, and in the end they may exceed them. While 
these two conflagrations demand our attention, it should be noted that between 1982- 
83 and 1997-98 a number of smaller but significant drought and fire events occurred in 
Indonesia, particularly in 1989, 1991, and 1994-95. The last, in 1994-95, prompted 
complaints from Singapore and Malaysia about the smoke and "haze" blowing in from 
Indonesia. The Minister of Forestry responded to these complaints in early 1995 by 
banning the practice of clearing land with fire. But it was not until late 1997 that both 
the effects and the complaints reached their latest crescendo.
Different agencies have offered different estimates of the extent of the damage. 
Official Indonesian estimates as of early October were that a mere 80,000 hectares had 
burned, but NGOs have produced much higher figures. The Indonesian environmental 
organization, W ALK (Wahana Lingkungan Kdup Indonesia) estimated that 1,714,000 
hectares of forest had burned from April through September 1997.15 This figure was 
broken down by area as follows: tree crop plantations accounted for 798,000 ha 
(ha=hectare) (46 percent) of the total area burned; production forest accounted for
578.000 ha (34 percent); the peat forest project area accounted for 260,000 ha (15 
percent); conservation forest areas accounted for 45,000 ha (3 percent); transmigration 
areas accounted for 30,000 ha (2 percent); and shifting cultivation areas accounted for
3.000 ha (virtually 0 percent) of the total area burned. WWF (the World Wide Fund for 
Nature) estimated that only 800,000 to 1 million hectares had burned in the same 
period, but by year's end WWF had revised its estimate to at least 2 million hectares
14 N. Wirawan, "The Hazard of Fire," p. 250. In defining disturbance, "lightly disturbed" seems to refer to 
areas 75 percent logged, "moderately disturbed" to areas 80 percent logged, and "heavily disturbed" to 
areas 80 percent logged, where logging occurred within the eight years prior to the fire.
15 "Hasil Investigasi Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Kerugian Rp. 11 Triliun Akibat Kebakaran Hutan," 
Suara Pembaruan, October 23,1997. The Rp. 11 trillion ($2.2 billion at a Rp 5000 exchange rate) monetary 
value was estimated based on Rp 380.3 billion of lost transportation business, Rp. 40 billion of lost fuel 
sales to Pertamina, Rp. 1.091 trillion of lost trade in thirteen provinces, and Rp. 10.284 trillion of forest 
losses.
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burned.16 The economic losses—especially from short-term health damages and 
tourism and industrial production downturns—were estimated to be $1.4 billion.
As happened before, notably in 1982-83, the most recent fires are occurring in an El 
Nino year, with characteristic drought creating dry conditions by the middle of the 
year. In fact, El Nino years have occurred more frequently in the 1990s than in the 
previous four decades (see Figure 1 "Southern Oscillation Index").17 The early months 
of the most recent ENSO (El Nino Southern Oscillation) were more severe than during 
the 1982-83 event (see Figure 2 "Southern Oscillation Index, 1997/98 and 1982/83 
compared), and by mid-May GTZ's Integrated Forest Fire Management project had 
sounded warnings that the risk of fire was great.18 News of rampant forest fires in 
Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Irian Jaya began to appear in July as the season for 
burning—particularly by plantations—began. Later fires were reported in Sulawesi 
and Java as well.
Figure 1
SOUTHERN OSCIAATON
1947 t® 1997
© John Daly, at http:www.vision.net.au/~daly/elnino.htm
16 Nigel Dudley and Jean-Paul Jeanrenaud, "A  Burning Issue: Forest Fires in Indonesia and the Am azon/' 
Interim Report for WWF (http://w w w .geotities.com /RainForest/2701/bum .htm l) and Fernando Gonzales, 
"Update on the Forest Fires in Indonesia," WWF-IP, March 24,1998.
17 Some have speculated that climate change has contributed to increasing severity and frequency of the 
ENSO events, although Nichols, "ENSO, Drought, and Flooding Rain in Southeast Asia," in Brookfield 
and Byron, South-East Asia's Environmental Future (1993) doubts it.
18 See IFFM's web page. The Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) compares sea level pressure in Tahiti and 
Darwin. Measurements for 1998, when compared with measurements for 1982, showed a greater drop 
through June but somewhat less extreme readings from July through March. Nonetheless, Indonesia 
continued to experience its most severe drought in decades.
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Figure 2
SOUTHERN OSCILLATION INDEX (SOI)
1997/98 and 1982/83 compared
Data: DMR, Queensland, Australia 
—  1982/83 1997/98
© John Daly, at http:www.vision.net.au/~daly/elnino.htm
International Haze and Attention
More than the fires, it is the smoke or "haze" that has caught people's attention and 
created international controversy this time.19 The cycles of international attention given 
the Indonesian fires and related developmental issues have come and gone with the 
winds that carry the haze. These actual winds tend to move north and west from 
Indonesia towards the Malay peninsula from April or May through November. As a 
result, in August, September, and October, the haze overwhelmed Singapore and 
Malaysia. It was equally if not more thickly concentrated inside Indonesia, but 
international news reports tended to emphasize the effects in the neighboring 
countries.
Indonesia's neighbors complained vociferously for a time.20 As the Air Pollution 
Index (API) in Kuching, Sarawak, exceeded the extremely hazardous level of five 
hundred for a number of days—even hitting 849 (!)—PM Mahathir Mohammad
19 Haze is defined as a high concentration of particulate matter, and in forest fire haze smaller particulates, 
less than ten micrograms in size, predominate. These smaller particles are more likely to be carried deep 
into the lungs and thus are of special concern, especially if they are loaded with carcinogenic compounds. 
The Air Pollution Index (API) and the similar Pollution Standards Index (PSD correspond to levels of 
particulate concentration in the air. See "Haze Guide," Integrated Forest Fire Management Project 
(Samarinda, Indonesia, 1998) on their web page: http://sm d.m ega.net.id/iffm /haze.htm .
One of the reasons that the haze may have been worse this time is that peat deposits of up to twenty 
meters depth have burned in Riau and in the areas of peat forest of Central Kalimantan drained for 
President Suharto's one million hectare ricefields mega-project.
20 In November, the Malaysian government, aware that Malaysian and Indonesian elites were bound to 
each other by a network of shared interests and overlapping ownership of plantations, actually "ordered 
scientists and environmentalists at state-funded universities to stop commenting about the country's haze 
problem." See "Malaysia Orders Hush on Haze," Associated Press, November 6,1997.
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donned a face mask and declared a state of emergency in Sarawak.21 In Singapore, the 
Straits Times published a series of color satellite images, including before-and-after 
shots on the front page, showing that forests were being cleared for plantations.22
The immediate effects of the haze on health, as well as basic economic activity, 
were tremendous. Thousands of people were treated in Malaysia and elsewhere for 
respiratory and eye complaints; schools and businesses were closed; and air flights 
were canceled frequently in Indonesia (Sumatra and Kalimantan), Malaysia (Sarawak), 
and the Philippines (Palawan and Mindanao). As the smoke reached southern 
Thailand, it had a negative effect on tourism in the whole region.
By the end of 1997, however, attention to the fires was waning.23 Sufficient rains 
had come to Sumatra and western Kalimantan to put out some fires and diminish the 
haze. Perhaps some Indonesian companies had stopped burning under threat of losing 
their cutting licenses from the government. For shifting cultivators, the season for 
burning had passed, as the annual cycle of cultivation is such that burning typically 
peaks around August and September; by the end of the year, these cultivators were 
more often busy trying to stop fires from spreading to their fields. As the levels of 
smoke decreased, more people became convinced that the rainy season had finally 
arrived, ending the problem for good. The larger history of ENSO events was ignored 
and long-term weather forecasts inside Indonesia suppressed, allowing this ephemeral 
glint of hope to survive for a few months.24
In early 1998, however, the fires "came back." As in previous El Nino years, the 
drought persisted into the first few months of the second calendar year. Because rains 
continued to fall, though sporadically and below normal levels, in western Kalimantan 
and Sumatra, the location of the most extensive and severe fires moved to East 
Kalimantan, where it was reported that no rain at all had fallen in the eighty-five days 
from late January through April 20.25 The haze did not become a major problem in 
Singapore and Malaysia again until late February as the winds started to shift, but 
Indonesia's neighbors are justifiably worried that last year's fire and haze crisis will 
repeat itself as we head into the normally drier months (May through October). 
However, at the April meeting of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
environmental ministers, everyone agreed to do nothing to combat the East 
Kalimantan fires because they were already out of control. There was inclusive
21 "Haze Overwhelms Singapore, Sarawak in State of Emergency," Kompas Online (English edition), 
September 20,1997. An API of 100 is considered "unhealthy" and one of 300 or more "hazardous."
22 "Fires Spread Across Indonesia, Blazes in Malaysia," Reuters, October 1,1997.
23 A number of the web pages that emerged in August and September to cover the fires have not been 
updated since.
24 During a brief trip to Indonesia around the New Year, I was told by a forestry consultant that TV 
broadcasters had been instructed by the military not to provide long-term forecasts of further drought, 
given the political dangers of unrest in the run-up to the March re-election of President Suharto. This 
consultant also accurately predicted the return of the fires by the end of January.
25 Ed Colijn, "News from Kalimantan," April 20,1998 (http ://w w w .bart.nl/~edcolijn/). The fires did not 
disappear from other regions completely; for example, the Straits Times reported more fires on plantations 
in Riau on February 17. The shifting fields of attention are indicative of the broader problems posed by 
governmental policymakers and media analysts who rely on technical fixes and focus on the fires as 
problem rather than symptom.
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discussion about establishing a fund to fight fires in the region and an appeal for 
foreign contributions.26
Satellite images are providing daily updates on the "hot spots."27 On April 16, 
1998, for example, the number of "hot spots" visible on NOAA (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration) satellite images of (most of) Borneo was 853. This 
number had fluctuated over time due to difficulties obtaining accurate and complete 
images given the cloud (and haze) cover. Readings in the prior weeks had included 
low and high reports of 23 and 971 hot spots (on March 21 and 8, respectively). The 
real number of fires probably has not fluctuated as much, but we should assume the 
numbers may well be greater than satellite images indicate, since those images cover 
large areas where data is unavailable due to cloud (and smoke) cover.28
Regular updates on the spatial extent of the fires are available in the press from the 
Environmental Impact Management Agency and the Forest Service (Dims Kehutanan) 
of East Kalimantan; presumably these are also based on satellite images. From January 
through April 18, they reported that 393,724 ha of forest had burned and estimated the 
value of the losses to be Rp 7.3 trillion.29 Five days earlier, when the official count was 
at 231,308 ha, it was broken down by land classification: 32 percent occurred in 
industrial timber estate (HTI) areas; 31 percent in Kutai National Park, which has had 
perennial illegal logging intrusions; 24 percent in logging concession (HPH) areas; 3 
percent in shifting cultivation fields and forest fallow (semak belukar); and 2 percent in 
the Mt. Soeharto Tourist Forest.30
On the one hand, such updates and figures are remarkable coming from inside the 
typically opaque and secretive Indonesian government. On the other hand, they give 
the false impression that, by counting, the government is able to somehow control the 
fires or even hold people responsible for them. There is good reason to doubt that the 
Indonesian government will effectively confront, assign responsibility for, and 
eventually begin to solve the problem of the fires. What is not in doubt, given the 1982- 
83 experience and the great percentage of the 1997-98 fires occurring in areas affected 
by plantation agriculture and extensive (legal and illegal) logging, is that the degree of 
ecological damage has been severe and forest recovery (if it happens at all) will occur 
over centuries.
26 "Let Fires Bum in Indonesia's E. Kalimantan—ASEAN," Reuters, April 4,1998.
27 NOAA satellite "hot spots" are areas of 1.1 km2 with high temperature over 48 degrees celcius detected. 
There may be a number of fires within such an area.
28 One of the numerous places where satellite images are updated regularly is the GTZ Integrated Forest 
Fire Management website (http://sm d.m ega.net.id/iffm /).
29 "Bukit Soeharto Dipapas jadi 30 Ribu ha," Suara Kaltim Online, April 20,1998. At an exchange rate of 
Rp. 8,500, that would be about US $850,000. Unlike the case with the WWF study, it is difficult to 
determine (at least from newspaper reports) exactly what losses are being calculated, i.e. only timber 
losses or non-timber and other economic losses too.
30 "Sudah 231 Ribu Hektar, Hutan dan lahan Kaltim yang Terbakar," Suara Kaltim Online, April 13,1998. 
Because of the drought and fire-related losses of food and habitat, the orangutan population is severely 
threatened as well. At times one gets the impression that more effort goes into saving these noble animals 
than stopping the fires or helping the human inhabitants of the forest. See, "OrangutansVictims of East 
Kalimantan Forest Fires," Kompas Online, April 13,1998.
A Brief History and Analysis of Indonesia's Forest Fire Crisis 73
III. Fires and Economic Crisis: The Historical Causal Connection
How did Indonesia get into the present situation, where both the area threatened 
by the fires and the intensity of the fires themselves is steadily increasing? One has to 
look back to the historical development of Indonesia's forest sector and the pattern of 
economic development of the New Order to discover the causes. In the early period of 
the New Order, oil revenue provided the basis for development. Since the 1979 and 
1982 drops in world oil prices, however, Indonesia has been searching for ways to 
develop non-oil industries. The effort has borne fruit, but most of these non-oil 
industries have been natural resource-based industries. In particular, they have been 
and continue to be based in the forests of Indonesia.
We can identify three stages in the process that has led to increasing exploitation of 
Indonesia's forests: first, the creation of a large Indonesian plywood industry; second, 
the push for an Indonesian pulp and paper industry; and most recently, expansion of 
oil palm plantations. Each of these initiatives, ironically, has been launched with the 
argument that it will contribute to "sustainable development" and that it will create 
national, Indonesian development, as opposed to exploitation by foreigners. In reality, 
however, these stages of forest-based development have progressively undermined the 
integrity of the tropical forest ecosystems and created concentrated control of the forest 
trees and land.31
1. Apkindo and Indonesian Plywood Marketing
Since the late 1980s, plywood has been Indonesia's leading non-oil export. The 
legal basis for the growth of Indonesia's plywood industry was the 1982 joint 
ministerial decree from Forestry, Industry and Trade which phased-out and then 
eliminated by 1985 the export of raw logs. It is worthwhile remembering that one of 
the initial rationales for this move into downstream processing of raw timber was a 
criticism of loggers by environmentalists—especially criticism of foreign logging and 
trading companies from Japan and America—that Indonesia's forests were being 
decimated at an excessive rate. After the New Order regime opened the forests of the 
"Outer Islands" to logging in 1967, log exports boomed, reaching an official peak of 
about 10 million m3 of wood in 1979. By the end of the 1970s, criticisms were mounting 
against a logging industry that pursued unsustainable harvesting levels and practices 
without providing any "national" benefits from those harvests and against logging 
concessionaires who had never fulfilled their promises to establish downstream 
processing in-country.32
31 For similar processes of progressive external control—and resistance to it—in Java's forests, see Nancy 
L. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People (Berkeley: UC Press, 1992).
32 The Indonesian government had been interested in developing wood industries for a long time. A 
Workshop between foreign and domestic industrialists and government officials was held in 1974 to 
discuss ways to achieve the targeted 18 percent annual growth in wood industries for Repelita I I1974/75 - 
1979/80. See Proceedings from Workshop on Wood Industries for Export, 17-19 December 1974, Jakarta, 
organized by the National Export Development Board (Badan Pengembangan Ekspor Nasional) in 
cooperation with the Indonesian Timber Community (Masyarakat Perkayuati Industry or MPI). MPI later 
changed to the Indonesian Forestry (Perhutanan) Community and became the umbrella organization over 
Apkindo and other timber producing associations with cartel-like ambitions.
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Despite all the criticism that has been launched against the Indonesian Wood Panel 
Association, Apkindo, and its leader (until his recent appointment as Minister of Trade 
and Industry) Mohamad "Bob" Hasan, the achievements of this organization are 
significant.33 Global timber markets tend to be very competitive due to the multiple 
sources of timber and the potential substitution of both temperate wood and non­
wood (e.g. aluminum window frames) for tropical wood. In the face of such 
competition and the power of Japanese consumers and plywood producers, Indonesia 
managed to break into the Japanese market and take over a large share of tropical 
plywood production from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. It thereby transformed itself from 
just another source of raw materials into a producer in control of over 70 percent of the 
tropical wood market. The power to do so came from the size of Indonesia's resource 
base and, importantly, the internal control over competition amongst producers by 
Apkindo, which set export prices, quantities and destinations, and beginning in 1990 
with the creation of Nippindo in Japan, created exclusive marketing and distribution 
outlets overseas.34
The domestic result of success in marketing plywood overseas has been 
overcapacity and a correspondingly rapacious appetite for raw materials. Based on 
estimates of wood recovery rates, the Indonesian wood products industry of which 
plywood is the dominant product requires over forty million cubic meters of wood per 
year, but the sustainable rate of timber harvest, according to official Indonesian 
documents, is twenty-six million cubic meters.35 In addition, Apkindo's power has 
over time led to an increasingly concentrated ownership and control of the forestry 
sector. The large and powerful firms have been able to avoid sanctions for 
transgressions against government regulations, and they have acquired additional 
forest areas as the first twenty-year concessions have expired. In East Kalimantan, the 
largest eight groups control over two-thirds of the forest concession area.
2. Pushing Plantations
At the same time as Indonesian plywood exports were growing in the late 1980s, 
the Indonesian government began to acknowledge depletion of the forests and express 
concern about the potential lack of raw materials to feed the industry. After fifteen 
years of intensive logging in the forests of Kalimantan and Sumatra, the signs of 
degradation were widespread. Both the 1985 IIED (International Institute for 
Environment and Development) study and the 1990 FAO (Food and Agriculture 
Organization) study of the forestry sector of Indonesia found that a great deal of the
33 Christopher Barr's essay on Apkindo in this issue is a strong indictment of Hasan's personal control of 
the plywood trade, but Barr also acknowledges the role of the organization in breaking into international 
timber markets. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Paul Gellert, "The Political Economy and 
Ecology of Indonesia's Timber Industry, 1967-1995," PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
1998.
34 This led South Korean importers to protest openly about unfair trade practices to Indonesia's Minister 
of Trade, Satrio B. ("Billy") Joedono. See Vincent Lingga, "Plywood Exports Fall in Wake of Apkindo Tug 
of War with Korea," Jakarta Post, October 27,1994. Joedono, who spoke about the need for changes in the 
running of the Apkindo organization in 1994, was later forced out of the cabinet by a reorganization that 
merged trade and industry, in the wake of the controversy over the national car project. In the 1998 
cabinet, Hasan became the new Minister of Industry and Trade.
35 Ministry of Forestry, Indonesia Tropical Forestry Action Plan (Jakarta: Ministry of Forestry, 1992).
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forest had been degraded.36 Therefore, the government of Indonesia began calling for 
the development of industrial tree plantations (hutan tanaman industri or HTI) as the 
key element in the new "sustainable forestry" policy. It exemplified this shift with the 
appointment of Hasjrul Harahap, who came to the Ministry of Forestry from 
Agriculture in 1988 due to his expertise and previous experience in tree crop 
plantations in Sumatra.
The twin rationale for the HTI program—it was meant to (1) increase the yield 
from "production" forests to fulfill the pressing demand of the timber industry and 
(2) rehabilitate "unproductive" or "degraded" forest land—had been laid out in 1983.37 
The idea of turning "degraded" secondary forest land into productive (plantation) 
forests appealed to the Department of Forestry, the timber industry, and international 
financial institutions like the World Bank. For the foresters, this strategy seemed to 
hold the promise of reforesting large areas of degraded forest, albeit under 
monoculture plantations. The World Bank and a number of economists approved of 
the policy, as it promised to make unproductive lands more productive and bring 
them into the market economy.
For the industrialists, however, the policy was attractive for two simple reasons. 
First, it gave them access to the forest. While the Indonesian Forestry Community's 
public relations efforts have emphasized the sustainable logging practices of the 
selective logging and replanting (TPTI) system in Indonesia, the industry has relied 
increasingly on wood from clear cuts (Ijin Penebangan Kehutanan or IPK). In East 
Kalimantan, for example, the targets for IPK cutting increased from 333,000 m3 in 
1990/91 to over one million m3 in 1994/95.38 The actual (official) volume of IPK 
cutting in 1993/94 was 836,638 m3, and since selective felling produced 4,436,731 m3 in 
the province that year, the harvest from clear cuts equaled a significant proportion— 
nearly one-fifth—of the harvest gained from selective logging.39
All of this cutting belies the notion that the plantations were being established on 
"degraded" or so-called "unproductive" forest lands, lands covered with grass 
(Imperata cylindrica, especially) or secondary brush. The grasslands are notoriously 
difficult and expensive to convert to plantations, and the companies are less interested 
in "degraded" lands, which by definition are areas with less than twenty cubic meters
36 HED/GOI (Government of Indonesia), A Review of Policies Affecting the Sustainable Development of Forest 
Lands in Indonesia (Jakarta: International Institute for Environment and Development and Government of 
Indonesia, 1985); FAO/GOI, Situation and Outlook of the Forestry Sector in Indonesia, 5 vols. (Jakarta: Food 
and Agriculture Organization and Directorate General of Forest Utilization in the Ministry of Forestry, 
Government of Indonesia, 1990).
37 SK Menhut No. 20/K pts-II/1983 translates as, "HTI development is one of the activities for 
reforestation and regeneration for increasing the potential of production forest in order to guarantee the 
supply of raw materials for industry and is an effort to rehabilitate production forests that are not 
productive." Cited in WALHI, "Hutan Tanaman Industri: Blunder Kedua Kebijakan Kehutanan di 
Indonesia," Jakarta, February 1995 (?). Legally, the 1983 decree was followed by SK Menhut No. 320/1986  
tentang Pembangunan HTI and PP N o.7/ 1990 tentang Pengusahaan HTI.
38 Data provided to author by Kanwil Kehutanan Kalimantan Timur.
39 Dinas Kehutanan Kalimantan Timur, Dinas Dalam Angka 1993/94 (Samarinda: East Kalimantan Forest 
Service, 1994).
76 Paul K. Gellert
per hectare of commercial timber (over 30 cm dbh).40 Environmentalists have rightly 
been critical of this natural subsidy provided to the industry, as well as the low level of 
replanting efforts by loggers once they have gotten the wood.
The second reason for industrial enthusiasm has been the financial subsidization of 
Indonesia's campaign to become the world's largest pulp and paper producer. Money 
from the Reforestation Fund (Dana Reboisasi or DR) has been used to fund plantations. 
Officially, 14 percent of the investment in private plantations and 35 percent of the 
investment in state-owned plantations can come from the fund. An additional 32.5 
percent is available from the DR in interest-free loans. In practice, it has been argued, 
the owners of plantations can use the capital for their own purposes if they make only 
minimal efforts in those subsidized plantations. In at least two cases (involving 
Suharto's half-brother Probosutedjo and Bob Hasan), there have been accusations of 
the DR money going to fund the multimillion or billion dollar pulp mills.41
One of the unanswered questions at this point with regard to HTI plantations and 
burning is to what extent companies have actually planted. Government figures 
perennially show planting to be far behind target. Also, the NGO critiques of IPK have 
implied that many areas are never developed into even fast-growing eucalyptus, acacia 
or albizia plantations. If that's true, there would not be much real incentive to clear the 
land (by fire or any means) after the bigger trees are harvested, unless it is to satisfy 
government monitors that an initial planting effort has been made. The prospects for 
oil palm and other agricultural crop plantations (perkebunan), on the other hand, are 
obviously good enough to encourage clearing and real planting efforts.
3. Oil Palm Plantations
The development of palm oil plantations is the new factor in the forest fires of 
1997-1998. In fact, like the fires themselves, palm oil is not new in Indonesia, however 
the pace and form of development of palm oil plantations is unprecedented. Spurred 
by government encouragement based on high market prices and a "nationalist" desire 
to beat Malaysia in this lucrative market, Indonesia's crude palm oil (CPO) exports 
were over a billion dollars in 1997. Such expansion has relied on rapid land clearing by 
burning (mimicking shifting cultivators on a large-scale) and thus contributed directly 
to the extent of this year's forest fires.42
Consider, again, the province of East Kalimantan. In 1980, none of the utilized 
agricultural land was allocated to estates; this contrasted with South and West 
Kalimantan, where a quarter to half the land was in estates.43 In fact, the farm land
40 WALHI, Hutan Tanaman Industri (Jakarta: WALHI, 1994), p. 18. See also, Larry Lohmann, "Freedom to 
Plant: Indonesia and Thailand in a Globalizing Pulp and Paper Industry/' in M. Pamwell and R. Bryant, 
ed. Environmental Change in South-East Asia (New York: Routledge, 1996).
41 See G. van Klinken, "Reforestation Fund," Inside Indonesia Digest 46 (December 8,1997).
42 See Table 2 for the areas under palm oil. The fact that fires have not been nearly as extensive on the 
Malaysian side of Borneo speaks both to the slower pace of plantation development there and stricter 
enforcement of bans on burning.
43 M. Pangestu, "East Kalimantan: Beyond the Timber and Oil Boom," in H. Hill, ed., Unity and Diversity: 
Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 170. 
The remaining categories and percentages for East Kalimantan are human settlement (9.6 percent), wet 
rice sawah (11.1 percent), dry field (67.9 percent), and mixed agriculture (11.4 percent). A higher percent
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dedicated to growing leading crops—rubber, coconuts, pepper, and cocoa—in 1985 
together amounted to a mere 61,900 hectares, and less than one-fifth of that was in 
large estates. In 1991, the Indonesian economist Mari Pangestu could still write, "Estate 
crops play a very minor role in East Kalimantan's economy."44 The reasons for this 
lack of estate crop development included the poor infrastructure for transporting 
goods out, the low population density and thus lack of available labor, and the 
relatively poor quality of the soils.
But the growth of palm oil plantations in the 1990s has been astonishing. In January 
1995, the Regional Forestry Office (Kanzvil) of East Kalimantan had applications for 1.4 
million ha of plantations, 990,000 ha of which were for palm oil.45 If these applications 
are implemented, estates will encompass an area ten times larger than 1985. On a 
national level, the actual increase was over four times (see Table 2, following). More 
recent data shows the importance of Riau in the conversion of over seven million ha to 
plantations in the late 1990s (see Table 3, following).
In an interesting twist, the fires of the 1980s may have paved the way for this 
development. A 1991 analysis noted that, although Kalimantan's forest cover was still 
considerably above the national average in all four provinces of Kalimantan, both 
Central and East Kalimantan had been "designated a major target for future estate crop 
and industrial wood plantations (HTI)" and in East Kalimantan this was to be "largely 
in areas affected by the 1982-83 firels]."46 Ironically, this means that the areas partially 
damaged by fire before may be ignited and set burning again to prepare the way for 
plantations in the 1990s in the name of "sustainable development."
4. The World Bank Steps In
As Indonesia moved to expand tree crops more generally it had full World Bank 
support. In 1986, the Bank reported a shift in its role from supporting subsistence- 
oriented transmigration of the population to encouraging tree crop agriculture. One 
key reason for the shift was the criticism the Bank had received for its role in the 
transmigration program, which by 1986 had moved 613,700 families from 
"overpopulated" Java, Bali, and Madura to "underpopulated" Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, 
and elsewhere.47 Transmigration had resulted in deforestation through conversion for 
settlements and agricultural fields and failed in efforts to alleviate poverty because the 
generally poor quality soils in places like Kalimantan could not support rice 
subsistence on small plots of land.
(36.6 percent) of cultivable land is utilized in East Kalimantan then in other Kalimantan provinces, but in 
East Kalimantan cultivable land makes up a mere 5.3 percent of total land area.
44 Ibid.
45 The data may be woefully incomplete as it only includes Kutai, Pasir, and Bulungan regencies. Data 
provided to author by Kanwil Kehutanan Kalimantan Timur, 1995.
46 J. Dick, "Forest Land Use, Forest Use Zonation, and Deforestation in Indonesia: A Summary and 
Interpretation of Existing Information," prepared for the State Ministry for Population and Environment 
(KLH: Kantor Lingkungan Hidup) and die Environmental Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL: 
Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan), June 1991. Quotations from page 36.
47 The figure, which refers to "sponsored" transmigrants and does not include the partially assisted or 
unassisted ones, is from World Bank, Indonesia: Sustainable Development of Forests, Land, and Water 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 1990), p. 33.
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Table 2
Palm Oil Production in Indonesia, 1975-1994, tons and percent of total
Year Public Estates Private Estates Smallholder Total
Tons % Tons % Tons %
1975 271171 68.3 126082 31.7 - 397253
1976 286096 66.4 144910 33.6 - 431006
1977 336891 73.6 120716 26.4 - 457607
1978 336224 67.1 165060 32.9 - 501284
1979 438756 68.4 201724 31.5 760 0.1 641240
1980 498858 69.2 221544 30.7 770 0.1 721172
1981 533399 66.7 265616 33.2 1045 0.1 800060
1982 598653 67.5 285212 32.2 2955 0.3 886820
1983 710431 72.3 269102 27.4 3454 0.4 982987
1984 814015 71 329144 28.7 4031 0.4 1147190
1985 861173 69.3 339241 27.3 43016 3.5 1243430
1986 912306 67.5 384919 28.5 53504 4 1350729
1987 988480 65.6 352413 23.4 165162 11 1506055
1988 1102692 64.4 454495 26.5 156148 9.1 1713335
1989 1184226 60.3 597039 30.4 183689 9.4 1964954
1990 1247156 51.7 788506 32.7 376950 15.6 2412612
1991 1360363 51.2 883918 33.3 413319 15.6 2657600
1992 1489745 45.6 1076900 33 699605 21.4 3266250
1993 1469156 42.9 1370272 40 582021 17 3421449
1994 1571501 39.2 1597227 39.9 839334 20.9 4008062
1995 1613848 36 1864379 41.6 1001443 22.4 4479670
1996 1751484 35.3 2111045 42.6 1097230 22.1 4959759
1997 1830960 34.2 2278846 42.5 1246735 23.3 5356541
Source: Indonesian Directorate General of Estates, as presented in D. F. Larson, "Indonesia's Palm Oil 
Subsector," Policy Research Working Paper 1654 (Washington, D C : The World Bank) for years through 
1993; "Menguak Perjalanan CPO," Prospek, February 23,1998, pp. 16-17, for remaining years.
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Table 3
Change of Status from Production Forest to Conversion Forest for Estate 
Plantations, through September 1997
Province Application3 Agreement3 Official Change of 
Land Status3
No. Area (ha) No. Area (ha) No. Area (ha)
A. On island of Sumatra:
1. N. Sumatra 6 49300 26 160313 15 74070
2. W. Sumatra 6 110315 12 51176 22 121140
3. Riau 18 176500 51 593431 102 1205668
4. Jambi 9 70290 11 47181 36 309393
5. S. Sumatra 14 289800 16 94173 8 42503
6. Bengkulu 4 28405 6 25000b 10 42888
7. Lampung 2 16300 4 61275 5 28051
B. On island of 
Kalimantan (Indonesian 
Borneo)
1. W. Kal 22 372700 18 127674 8 89400
2. C. Kal. 34 516250 27 1835619 32 349556
3. S. Kal. 2 10550 6 64130 18 189678
4. E. Kal. 33 634200 32 444112 39 269081
TOTAL 150 2274610 209 3504084 295 2721428
Source: "Luas Hutan Yang Dikonversi Untuk Perkebunan 7 Juta Hectare," Suara Pembaruati, October 10, 
1997 (http://w w w .suarapem baruan.com /N ew s/1997 /10/101097/Ekonom i/ekol4/ekol4.htm l) from 
Directorate General of Inventory (Intag), Department of Forestry, 1997.
Notes: a =  Application to and approval by the Department of Forestry, presumably. The source of the 
official change (SK Pelepasan) is not clear, either the Department of Forestry or Agrarian Affairs 
(Agraria). b =  Source document had 25, and I merely assume they meant 25,000.
The Bank, admitting some of the critique, argued that tree crops could solve several 
problems at the same time because the tree crops would be ecologically more 
sustainable, provide foreign exchange to Indonesia, and alleviate poverty for millions 
of smallholder families. Whereas it had allocated $560 million for the transmigration 
program over the previous decade, it planned to allocate $680 million of fresh funds 
for the establishment of "nucleus estate and smallholder" (NES) estates.48 This level of 
investment clearly played a role in the growth of plantations witnessed in Indonesia.
The NES estate concept called for the "nucleus" of a government-owned estate to 
be established within a larger "plasma" area of smallholders, who would grow the 
same crop and sell their produce to the government estate.49 In effect, the smallholders
48 Transmigration Sector Review (Washington DC, The World Bank, 1986).
49 Around the same time, the HTI-Trans program was bom, which was intended both to assist the timber 
industry in establishing more fast-growing tree plantations and to provide additional income through 
employment to transmigrants during the first few years. The HTI-Trans program may have been Bob 
Hasan's brainchild; it was tried out first at his East Kalimantan Kiani Lestari concession.
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would be living under contract relations with the larger estate. As Michael Dove writes 
(of rubber),
The project design is based on the assumption that the principal obstacle to the 
development of smallholdings is their small size and scattered location . . .  and, 
by implication, absence of government control. It is further based on the premise, 
that the basic problem with smallholdings is the extent to which they are unlike 
estates. The government solution then is to create smallholdings that are more 
like estates rather than smallholdings in their capital intensity and economies of 
scale; and to centralize management under the government as opposed to local 
management by individuals. . . 50
The persistent bias towards large, estate plantations is evident in a recent World 
Bank working paper on the oil palm sector, although this more recent document is 
characterized by a 1990s emphasis on private as opposed to state-owned plantations.51 
It is striking that the World Bank paper omits counting cost of land clearing, which is 
most cheaply done by fire, in its calculation that figures Indonesian production costs to 
be "among the lowest in the world."52 The World Bank paper also fails to take into 
account fire-related losses.
In sum, land issues are paramount in explaining the fires and the pattern of 
development in Kalimantan (as elsewhere in Indonesia). Reuters has reported on 
plantations using arson "to force people off land wanted mainly for oil palms."53 From 
the investors'—and the World Bank's—point of view, however, the chief issue has to 
do with frustrating complications that arise because the smallholders' ownership of 
private property and clear title to plots of land are difficult to negotiate. Allow me to 
quote at length from the Bank working paper:
Once a plantation company has identified a potentially suitable site, the 
company begins a two-pronged approval process. The company first files an 
application with the Director General of Estates for a location permit. The 
location permit also requires [application to and] the approval of the local 
governor.. . .  The estate company conducts a location study which it provides to 
both the local and central government. Once both applications are approved, the 
central and local forestry agencies conduct a review of the project's impact. Once 
this review process is complete, the complicated process of identifying settlers 
and providing compensation to those settlers is begun. Since the land is 
infrequently titled, these negotiations can be complicated and intractable.
5® Michael Dove, "So Far from Power, So Near to the Forest: A Structural Analysis of Gain and Blame in 
Tropical Forest Development," in C. Padoch and N. L. Peluso, eds. Borneo in Transition: People, Forests, 
Conservation, and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 47.
51 Donald F. Larson, Indonesia's Palm Oil Subsector, Policy Research Working Paper 1654 (Washington DC: 
The World Bank, 1996). In the study, smallholder production is included in total palm oil production, but 
the paper does not specify whether this is tied into the NES program. Clearly there are "transaction costs" 
in obtaining accurate production cost data on smallholders, but such costs should not pose problems for as 
large a data-collecting enterprise as the World Bank. All production cost data is for estates.
52 Larson, Indonesia's Palm Oil Subsector, p. 3.
53 "Arson Blamed for Some Indonesian Bush Fires," Reuters, March 5,1998.
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Following the negotiations, the land is typically leased for thirty years with an 
option to renew, rather than purchased outright.
The lack of clear title certainly builds a barrier to investment in tree crops. 
However the implication for smallholders is much broader. Lack of title inhibits 
transfers of ownership in general, and smallholders who may wish to migrate to 
better opportunities may have to abandon valued properties.54
There are several problems inherent in this approach and the assumptions that 
underlie it, many of which stem from the Bank's tendency to place large investors 
ahead of smallholders. Notice that the "complicated process" of dealing with 
individual settlers is only begun after the firm has selected a suitable site for growing 
palm oil and obtained the approval of the regional and central governments. Notice 
also that once the firm has selected a site and the process of developing the NES 
plantation has begun, the working paper published by the Bank recommends that 
compensation be given to "identified settlers"; in this way, the paper fails to take into 
account the pre-existing, though not formally recognized, land rights of indigenous 
groups and the possibility that such groups might not wish to have their land 
incorporated into a plantation. Also, the logic of the Bank's approach rests on the 
assumption that granting clear title to property would encourage large numbers of 
smallholders to migrate to Kalimantan, but this assumption is unfounded. Except in 
accessible areas near the river cities, there is little evidence that in-migration pressure is 
significant in East Kalimantan. What is more, since the state retains eminent domain 
over the land and only leases it to the companies, the rights of smallholders over their 
own land become even more tenuous. It is not surprising, then, that NES plantations 
have failed to attract waves of smallholders to the interior, and that instead the tidal 
movement created by this development seems to flow outward, as the plantation 
sector grows larger and consequently infringes on the forest product and land rights of 
indigenous groups.
The financial, economic, and political crisis facing Indonesia may exacerbate the 
pressures on the forest from plantations. With devaluation of the rupiah (from Rp. 
2500 to Rp. 8500) and largely local inputs (i.e. forest and labor), palm oil exports have 
become more lucrative than ever. Perhaps that is why, in the second and third IMF 
attempts to bail out the Government of Indonesia (January and April 1998), a condition 
was inserted that required the nation to open palm oil development to foreign 
investors. In addition, the 1998 IMF agreement requires that CPO exports are to be 
allowed again; exports of palm oil were halted in January by government officials 
concerned to protect domestic supplies of cooking oil, since they feared a shortage 
might spark social unrest before and around the March re-election of Suharto.
At the time of this writing, it is uncertain whether the Indonesian government will 
actually lift the export ban and substantially reopen the industry to foreign investment. 
Bob Hasan is making "nationalist" complaints about the IMF interfering in the 
development of Indonesia. He repeats his complaints with an air of confidence and 
sincerity, despite the fact that the small coterie of Suharto's friends and clients who are
54 Larson, Indonesia's Palm Oil Subsector, p. 19. He goes on to suggest that the Bank can assist in land 
titlement because it has experience in this area.
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now gaining access to the forests for palm oil plantations happen to be the same people 
who profited from the plywood and timber plantations.55
IV. The Political Economy of Blame: Evidence, Diversion, and Power
"Why should we bum the forests? We need the raw materials. It doesn't 
make sense." - M. Bob Hasan56
"If you do land-clearing in pioneer areas, where no roads are 
established, the only practical way to get rid of the debris is to bum it."
- A. F. S. Budiman, Executive Director of the Rubber Association of 
Indonesia57
"Kalimantan at this time is part of the Wild West, part of a nation 
without government, like parts of America in the 19th Century." - 
Juwono Sudarsono, Minister of Environment58
"The use of fire to aid in clearing land was something English settlers 
borrowed from their Indian predecessors, but they applied it for 
different purposes and on a much more extensive scale. Instead of 
burning the forest to remove undergrowth, they burned it to remove 
the forest itself." - W. Cronon59
Who is to blame for the fires? Or perhaps we should be more specific and ask what 
is the real allocation of blame among smallholders, plantations, and arsonists seeking 
to grab land? It will probably be years before the detailed technical studies of the 1997- 
98 fires are finished. But we need not wait. These studies will not solve the very 
political problem of allocating blame. If this year's fires have proved anything, it is that 
knowledge is not the same as power. The satellite evidence that shows fires burning in 
plantation areas is undeniable, but the question of who actually caused them can (and 
will) still be debated ad museum.
It is in this context that Hasan's rhetoric, a sample of which is quoted above, is 
more a diversion from taking blame than a real engagement of the political economy of 
fire in Indonesia's forests. To be sure, the logging companies would prefer not to have 
the big trees bum before they have a chance to cut them (although the currently 
depressed timber markets in Japan and the rest of Asia make that preference less clear). 
But the distinction between logging companies (HPH) on the one hand and timber
55 See G. J. Aditjondro, "Palm Oil Nepotism Adds Fuel to Disaster," Australian Financial Review, October 
13,1997. Also, during my field work in 1995,1 met a logging camp manager who was busy studying palm  
oil because he had been re-assigned to direct the company's new plantation.
56 "Indonesia Timber Barons Deny Blame for Fires," Reuters, September 30,1997.
57 Margot Cohen with Murray Hiebert, "W here There's Smoke..." Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2, 
1997. Budiman went on to explain that if a local official tries to enforce the law against burning, "You just 
bribe him ." After the article was published, Budiman may have suffered for his bluntness, as he 
complained to Cohen that he had been misquoted (M. Cohen, personal communication, January 1998).
58 Nelson Graves, "Thickening Smog sets off SE Asia Alarm Bells," Reuters, April 14,1998.
59 W. Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology cfNew England (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1983), p. 118.
A Brief History and Analysis of Indonesia's Forest Fire Crisis 83
estates (HTI) and palm oil plantations on the other is a thin legal line.60 In fact, neither 
Hasan individually nor the logging industry as a whole can separate itself from the 
land clearing for plantations, since these plantations are often owned in common by a 
number of cronies and, as we have seen, they supply the plywood industry with raw 
material. Even when sub-contractors are hired to do the actual forest clearing and land 
preparation, the industrial owner can hardly claim ignorance or lack of responsibility 
for the method of clearing.61 Fire is simply the cheapest way to clear land.
In contrast to government officials who blamed "slash and burn" shifting 
cultivators for causing 1982-83 fires, today's officials, notably the former Ministers of 
Environment and of Forestry, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja and Djamaluddin 
Suryohadikusumo, have been willing to blame the large industrial actors.62 Sarwono 
was particularly critical towards the end of his term. He called efforts to blame either 
El Nino or shifting cultivators for the fires "nonsense," and he blamed "irresponsible 
plantation operators" (orang-orang kebun memang kurang ajar) outright.63 On September 
15 and 17, 1997, Djamaluddin publicly announced that 176 companies were 
responsible for the fires burning in Sumatra and Kalimantan and suspended their IPK 
cutting licenses. Of these, 133 were estate (agricultural tree crop) plantations, twenty- 
eight were industrial tree plantations, and fifteen were transmigration sites.64 The 
Minister gave the companies until the end of the month to prove their innocence.65
However, the implementation of the Minister's sanctions has been disappointing. 
Most of the companies had failed even to respond by the deadline. Perhaps they did 
not really believe that the Minister was serious. Or, perhaps they knew that the threat 
would not be implemented. Some of the recalcitrant companies included those of 
powerful timber tycoons Liem Soie Liong, Prajogo Pangestu (PT Surya Hutani Jaya) 
and Bob Hasan (PT Kiani Lestari, PT Tanjung Redep Hutani, and PT ITCI Hutani 
Manunggal). When they finally filled out their reports (BAP: Berita Acara
60 During my research, I had expected to be able to examine both the HPH and HTI operations, at several 
companies. When I reached the field I discovered that they had split into two companies, for example PT. 
ITCI and PT. ITCI Hutani Manunggal, and that I therefore would need separate letters of introduction to 
conduct research at the HTI sites.
61 See "W arga Mengaku Diupah untuk Membakar Hutan," Suara Kaltim Online, March 16,1998. Thirteen 
residents of Muara Kedang, Kutai, acknowledged being promised Rp. 11 million to bum an area at night.
62 Hasan, on the other hand, has continued to blame the shifting cultivators as well as "communist" non­
governmental organizations. Unfortunately, many articles in the press, either out of ignorance or the 
relative ease of access to small farmers over big businessmen, also blame the poor smallholders. Even the 
venerable New York Times devoted a quarter-page photograph to one such farmer who the caption 
identified as a man who was busy lighting fires.
63 "Sarwono Kusumaatmadja: Orang Kebun Itu Kurang Ajar," Indonesia Daily News Online, March 14, 
1998.
64 "Siapa Membakar Hutan," D&R, September 27,1997, pp. 28-29.
65 The legal status of burning is not exactly clear. Following the 1994-95 fires, Djamaluddin banned 
burning, and this ban was reiterated by the Minister of Forestry and by the President in September 1997. 
However, companies also were said to be practicing "controlled burning" (a la restoration ecology in the 
West) based on 1995 technical guidelines (SK Diijen Perkebunan No. 38/K B110/SK .BU N /05) from the 
Director General of Plantations, then in the Ministry of Agriculture, and a 1997 decree with technical 
guidelines from within the Ministry of Forestry (SK Menhut No. 889/M enhut-V I/1997 and SK Diijen 
PHPA No. 47/K pts/D J-V I/1997) which was only revoked on October 10,1997 (SK Diijen PHPA No. 
152/K pts/D J-V I/1997). See Green News Indonesia No. 02/Indo/1998.
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Pemeriksaan), they blamed carelessly dropped cigarettes and "other" companies for 
spreading fire to their areas. What's more, by December most of the 176 licenses had 
been reinstated, exposing again the Ministry's lack of autonomy and authority. By 
April 1998 only about five were undergoing prosecution.66 It is increasingly difficult to 
piece together the names of companies and the progress of prosecutions from the 
Indonesian media. On March 7, East Kalimantan police were said to be investigating 
twenty-seven companies for illegal burning, and on March 17, one company, PT 
London Sumatra was convicted of large-scale burning near the Jempang Lakes.67
The successful prosecution of a few firms for illegal burning may, ironically, bolster 
the government and industry's claims of increasing oversight while providing little 
real change. The maximum reported penalties are some jail time (unlikely, especially 
for owners) and Rp. 200 million fines (about US$ 23,000 at present).68 Particularly 
when the firms punished are foreign, such as PT London Sumatera, there is an 
uncanny fit with the nationalist diversion being played out by the Suharto regime. If 
Indonesia's timber tycoons can hide behind rhetoric that demands an end to foreign 
exploitation while at the same time they are allowed to disregard existing Indonesian 
regulations, we must expect that control of production and trade in the growing palm 
oil sector will become increasingly concentrated in the hands of these same tycoons 
and their associates.
Fines for illegal burning also fit into proposed technical solutions to the fires. 
ICRAF (International Centre for Research in Agroforestry), in an October report, 
suggested that the problem was "too much smoke in the wrong place at the wrong 
time."69 ICRAF recommended that, rather than continue to impose "unenforcable 
bans," the government should analyze and fix the when, where, and perhaps the how of 
burning. Technical improvements to "fire technology" do have their merit, as those 
suffering from burning eyes, ruined travel plans, and even serious damage to the lungs 
can attest. But questions about why there is burning and how much land clearing by 
burning should be allowed are left unaddressed by ICRAF's recommended policy, and 
there's the danger.
Changes brought about by the new cabinet appointed in March do not bode well 
for reform. The insertion of "bun" (perkebunan or agricultural tree crop plantations) 
into "hut" (kehutanan or forestry) in the new Department of Forestry and Plantations 
appears to complete a process of ascension by the foresters in Indonesia's political 
administration. Moving from its subordinate beginnings as a Directorate General 
under the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry became an independent ministry in 1983. 
Now, rather than forfeiting jurisdiction over the large areas of forest being converted 
into tree crops or transformed into transmigration settlements and granting 
jurisdiction over those lands to the Ministers of Agriculture and Transmigration, the 
Minister of Forestry has gained permanent control over the allocation of those lands.
66 Angie Ramos, "Interview: Indonesia Not Prosecuting Fire Starters," Reuters, April 15,1998.
67 Suara Kaltim Online and IFFM, cited in "Update on Fires/Drought in Indonesia, Down to Earth 
(February/M arch 1998).
68 MPI, "Briefing Paper: Indonesia's Forest Fires," (Jakarta, October 2,1997). The errors and misdirection 
of this briefing paper are too numerous to delineate.
69 Thomas P. Tomich, "Managing Fires to Reduce Smoke," ICRAF, October 10,1997.
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To date, however, what the Ministry of Forestry has gained in jurisdiction it has lost in 
autonomy. As leader of Apkindo and trusted friend of Suharto, Hasan had been 
referred to as the "real" Minister because of his decision-making power. Now, with his 
official government capacity elevated to Minister of Industry and Trade, Hasan has 
seen his powers expanded from control over marketing of forest products to control 
over all industries.
The IMF solution to the financial crisis, i.e. further opening to foreign capital, is 
likely to exacerbate this ecological crisis, as well as social conflicts in Indonesia's 
forests, where they remain less visible than the protests and calls for change in the 
cities and university campuses. Although the IMF's effort to eradicate monopolies and 
cartels, if successful, may provide the necessary condition for open discussion of the 
political economy of forestry (and other) policy in Indonesia, it is not sufficient to 
change the thrust of the developmental model. And its push to allow foreign 
investment—specifically in palm oil—would surely result in further clearing of the 
forest. At the same time, it provides fodder for the anti-IMF rhetoric of Suharto and 
Hasan.
Finally, one can expect continued expansion of plantations in Indonesia and the 
possibility, if technical solutions do not succeed, of forest fires capturing international 
attention in future El Nino years. The case of colonial New England is surprisingly 
instructive. Like the colonial settlers, late-twentieth-century plantation owners in 
Indonesia's Outer Islands have been using the traditional tool—fire—for land clearing 
on a much greater scale than indigenous populations before them. The more extensive 
use of fire led to similar concerns about spreading fire damage in New England, and it 
also led to technical solutions. As Cronon notes, when the danger of spreading fires 
was realized in colonial New England, burning was restricted by government 
regulation to the wettest months of the spring. But the process of clearing and 
dispossessing the indigenous settlers continued apace, as it has in Kalimantan and 
Sumatra in the twentieth century. In these islands we do not find, as the new Minister 
of Environment's statement might indicate, a mythical, and "lawless" Wild West. 
Rather, we discover a land exploited by a government whose policies insure the 
accumulation of power, profit, and property by its friends—and, if the IMF has its way, 
by foreign investors as well—thus threatening the rights of the powerless who live in 
the forest and the future of the forest itself.
